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Sinkler and Guerard: Public Corporations

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
HUGER SINKLER AND THEODORE B. GUERARD*
PREFACE

The cases reviewed under the heading of Public Corporations
include many interesting decisions dealing with diverse subjects. Among the questions before the Supreme Court was a
proposed scheme wherein two Counties and a City would
underwrite the construction of an airport, a contest arising
out of the rivalry between a privately owned electric company
and an electric cooperative, and a jurisdictional dispute involving three governmental units. Also there are a number of
decisions arising out of condemnation cases.
Richland-Lexington Airport District Financing Scheme
Held Unconstitutional
In an earlier decision,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the financing of the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport
through the issuance of general obligation bonds of the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport District, payable from an ad valorem district-wide tax. The financial arrangements there
involved the two counties of Greenville and Spartanburg.
In the decision under review here, Watson, et al v. Pulliam,2
the Court had occasion to consider a financial scheme involving three governmental units, to-wit, Richland County,
Lexington County, and the City of Columbia, for the purpose
of financing the construction of the Richland-Lexington Airport. The 1961 legislative enactment under attack created
the Richland-Lexington Airport District, which extends over
the entire area embraced by the counties of Richland and
Lexington, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining
an airport. To defray the cost of constructing the airport,
the Commission was authorized to issue general obligation
bonds of the District and to levy an ad valorem district-wide
tax, sufficient to retire the indebtedness. In these particulars
the enactment here did not differ materially from the legis*Sinkler, Gibbs and Simons, Charleston, S. C.
1. Berry v. Milliken, 234 S. C. 518, 109 S. E. 2d 354 (1959).
2. 239 S. C. 186, 121 S. E. 2d 910 (1961).
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lation upheld in the earlier Greenville-Spartanburg Airport
District litigation.
The plan here under attack, however, departed from the
earlier approved district-wide financing plan in that three
governmental units, Richland County, Lexington County, and
the City of Columbia, were involved and each was to provide
/8 of the debt service for the bonds from the annual "kickbacks" to counties and municipalities from the taxes levied
by the State on alcoholic beverages, beer and wine, and on
personal and corporate incomes. These obligations were to be
evidenced by notes of each unit to the Airport District.
Legislation in pari materia also adopted by the 1961 General Assembly similarly provided that the three governmental
units would make provision to cover any operating deficit of
the Airport District by the levying of taxes. This "Operating
Deficit Act" authorized the Comptroller General to withhold
"kick-backs" from any of the three governmental units which
should fail to provide its 1/8 share of the operating deficit.
The lower court sustained both the District Act and the
Operating Deficit Act, each of which was challenged on numerous grounds: The lower court concluded that the provisions
of the Operating Deficit Act requiring the three units each
to levy sufficient taxes was unconstitutional, but sustained
the remaining portions of the Operating Deficit Act, stating
that the unconstitutional part was separable from the rest.
Essentially, the lower court considered the proposed arrangement as a joint venture voluntarily entered into by three
political subdivisions of the type -and in the manner approved
in several earlier decisions.3
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court and
held both acts unconstitutional. The Supreme Court refused
to regard the proposed scheme as a Joint venture of the type
sustained in earlier decisions. On the- contrary, the Court
considered that the City of Columbia "is given no voice
whatsoever in determining whether that governmental entity
shall enter into this venture." It based this conclusion on its
reading of the District Act as obliging the city to underwrite
1/3 of the debt service of the district's general obligation bonds,
3. Allen v. Adamns, 66 S. C. 344, 44 S. E. 939 (1903), a Town and a
School District; Fripp v. Coburn, 101 S. 0. 312, 85 S. E. 774 (1915) two
Towns; Bagnall v. Clarendon and Orangeburg Bridge District, 131 S. C.
109, 126 S. E. 644 (1925), two counties; and Cothran v. Mallory, 211 S. C.
387, 45 S. E. 2d 599 (1947), a County and a City.
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and on its reading of the Operating Deficit Act as providing
for the withholding of the city's share of kick-back by the
Comptroller General if the city should fail to provide its
part of the operating deficit. In both instances the Court concluded that the City of Columbia had no discretion as to
whether it would or would not cooperate in the venture.
Viewing the proposed arrangement as it did,. the Court
correctly declared the acts under attack unconstitutional as
violative of the rights of the City of Columbia under Article
VIII, Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution, which
prohibits the General Assembly from depriving one municipality of powers accorded other municipalities of the same
class, or from imposing restrictions upon one municipality
which are not imposed upon other municipal corporations of
the same class, a constitutional safeguard which was recently
sustained in the case of Sossamon v. Greater Gaffney Metropolitan Utilities District.4 A portion of the City of Columbia's
share of state "kick-backs" was diverted from general municipal uses to help defray the cost of constructing the district's
airport, and no other city was subjected to a similar restriction.
It is interesting to note that in conclusion, the opinion
states:
We may add, however, that under the plan of financing
embodied in this Act, which is a sort not heretofore
passed upon by this Court, there is presented a serious
question by appellants' claim that the Legislature has
sought here to do by indirection that which it is prohibited from doing by Section 1, Article 10 of the Constitution, requiring that taxation be equal and uniform
throughout the area taxed.
Power of Appointment Does Not Include Power of Removal
The case of Stewart v. Union County5 concerned an action
brought by the plaintiff to recover wages due him. The plaintiff was appointed pursuant to statute by the Union County
Supervisor as superintendent of the county home and captain
of the Union County chain gang for a term beginning July 1,
1958, and ending July 30, 1959. In the middle of his term,
and on January 5, 1959, a new supervisor took office, and
4. 236 S. C. 173, 113 S. E. 2d 534 (1960).

5. 239 S. C. 610, 124 S. E. 2d 329 (1962).
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at 7:00 A.M. that morning before he himself had qualified as
supervisor, he discharged the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
unsuccessful in his appeals to the Board of Township Commissioners for reinstatement and for his salary for the remainder of his term. The lower court sustained the county's
demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed the court below on
the grounds that while the Supervisor of Union County is
expressly given by statute the power to appoint the superintendent of the county home and a captain of the Union County
chain gang, it did not follow that he had the power of removal
except for cause, in the absence of any provision in the statute
providing for summary removal. The Court held the plaintiff's removal unwarranted and that the plaintiff was entitled
to a judgment for the balance of his salary.
It is interesting to note that here was involved no question
of who was to perform the functions of the superintendent
of the county home and the captain of the chain gang for the
balance of the year. These were apparently done by the new
appointee. This was merely an action for salary.
The record is silent regarding other employment which
the appellant could have obtained or any remuneration which
he received from other employment during the balance of his
term. It would seem that these factors might have been
material, inasmuch as an employer can show in mitigation of
damages that the discharged employee obtained, or could have
obtained other employment. The burden in this connection
would appear to be upon the employer. 6
Jurisdiction of South Carolina Water Pollution Control
Authority Over Pollution of Streams or Other Waters
of the State Upheld
The Board of Public Works of the City of Gaffney, a
municipal agency charged with the management and control
.of the waterworks and sewerage systems of Gaffney, had
determined to enlarge the sewage disposal plant of the
City of Gaffney, located on Beaverdam Creek in Cherokee
County. In April, 1959, Beaverdam Creek was given a lower
classification by the South Carolina Water Pollution Authority
in order to permit the Board of Public Works to complete the
!.proposed enlargement. Later that year, the supervisors of
the Cherokee County Soil Conservatioii District, within whose
6. Latimer v. York Cotton Mills, 65 S. C. 135,:44 S. E. 559 (1903).
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boundaries the sewage disposal plant and Beaverdam Creek
were located, sought to have Thickety Creek reclassified
upwards from class C to class A. Beaverdam Creek is a
tributary of Thickety Creek and flows into Thickety Creek
west of the City of Gaffney. This application was brought
about as a part of a plan of the supervisors to create an
extensive watershed on Thickety Creek.
In June, 1960, the Authority concluded that Thickety Creek
should retain its class C classification, and denied the application for an upward classification, and shortly thereafter,
in August, 1960, the Authority granted the Board of Public
Works a permit to construct the proposed enlargement of the
disposal plant on Beaverdam Creek.
Thereupon, the supervisors brought this action, Camp, et
al v. Board of Public Works,7 against the Board of Public
Works and the South Carolina Water Pollution Authority, in
an effort, to have the Court invalidate the permit issued to
the Board to construct an enlargement to the disposal plant
on Beaverdam Creek, to restrain the Board from constructing
the proposed sewage disposal treatment plant on Beaverdam
Creek, and finally, to restrain the Board from proceeding with
the enlargement until the validity of the permit had been
established by the Court.
Thus, the case involves a dispute among three state administrative agencies, all of which are statutory bodies whose
powers are set forth in and prescribed by.the Statutes of
South' Carolina - the Board of Public Works, charged with
the operation of the waterworks and sewer system of the
City of Gaffney; the South Carolina Water Pollution Authority, vested with the jurisdiction'to abate, control and prevent
the pollution of the waters of the State; and the Cherokee
County Soil Conservation District, created to conserve the
soil resources of the district and control or prevent soil
erosion.
Although there were numerous questions raised regarding
the merits of the controversy, the Supreme Court, in reversing
the order of the lower court voiding the permit, decided the
matter solely on the grounds that the respondent Conservation
District had no' standing to attack the action of the Authority.
7. 238 S. C. 461, 120 S. E. 2d 681 (1961).
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Assuming that under some circumstances, one public agency
may attack the action of another, the Court concluded that
the complaining agency must at least show that it has some
special interest from which it is charged with responsibility
that may be adversely affected by the action attacked. In the
instant case, the Court could not find where the Conservation
District was given any statutory jurisdiction over the pollution of streams or other waters of the State, and that the
classification and the regulation of the purity and quality of
water had been committed solely to the South Carolina Water
Pollution Authority. The Soil Conservation District was
charged only with the conservation of the soil resources and
the control and prevention of soil erosion, a matter which
the Court found was not affected by the discharge of sewage
into Beaverdam Creek. Thus, the Court concluded that the
Soil Conservation District lacked any standing to attack
the action of the Authority in the classification of Beaverdam
Creek, or to challenge the validity of the permit granted by
the Authority to the Board of Public Works.
The correctness of the Court's holding in this case is most
readily apparent from a reading of the two statutes involved,
to-wit: Section 63-51 through 63-167 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1952, relating to the creation and function
of Soil Conservation Districts, and the Water Pollution Control
Law, codified as Chapter 3 of Title 7 of the Code of Laws
of South Carolina, 1952. Nowhere in the Soil Conservation District Laws are the supervisors of a district either expressly or
impliedly given any function or power to concern themselves
with the degree of pollution that exists in the streams of the
state. On the other hand, the Water Pollution Control Law
clearly and specifically grants to the South Carolina Water
Pollution Authority jurisdiction over the streams, rivers and
waters of the state.
Liability of Municipality in Tort
The questions before the Court in the two cases of Hollifield
v. Keller, et a18 arose out of an automobile accident allegedly
caused by ice on Devine Street in the City of Columbia. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant property owner had
permitted water to flow from a freezing unit tower on the
top of his building out into Devine Street during freezing
8. 238 S. C. 584, 121 S. E. 2d 213 (1961).
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weather, where it formed a sheet of ice, and that the plaintiff, Katherine M. Hollifield, driving her automobile along
Devine Street, skidded or slipped on the ice and crashed into
a telephone pole, allegedly causing her serious and painful
injuries. Causes of action were also brought against the
City of Columbia under Section 47-70 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1952, 9 on the grounds that the negligent acts
and omissions on the part of the city, combined with the
negligent acts on the part of the other defendants, proximately
caused the injuries.
There are two separate appeals involved. One is in an action
by the person injured, Katherine M. Hollifield, for personal
injuries resulting from the accident, and the other is in an
action by her husband, Joseph A. Hollifield, for loss of his
wife's services and his right of consortium.
The appeals were brought by the City of Columbia from
orders of the lower courts (the husband's suit was brought in
the Richland County Court, and the wife's suit was brought
in Richland County Court of Common Pleas), overruling
various motions to strike, and demurrers entered by the
city.
In both cases the city had demurred on the grounds that
the several causes of action, one against the landowner and
one against the city, were improperly united in that the said
causes of action affect the various parties differently. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's overruling of these
demurrers, and held that where a municipality and its codefendants are charged with separate and independent acts
of negligence which jointly and concurrently caused the plaintiff's injuries, the city and its co-defendants are subject to
being sued as joint tort feasors. Here, although two causes
of action are separately designated, the Court held that
they, in fact, stated only one cause of action against the city
and the co-defendants as joint tort feasors, the only difference
being in the amount of damages claimed against the respective
defendants.
9. "Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damages in his
person or property through a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or
public way or by reason of a defect or mismanagement of anything under
control of the corporation within the limits of any city or town may re-

cover in an action against such city or town the amount of actual damages
sustained by him by reason thereof .

.

. No person bringing an action

under this section shall recover property damages in excess of two thou-

sand dollars or damages in case of personal injury or death in excess of
eight thousand dollars..
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The appellant city took the position that Mrs. Hollifield's
alleged pain and suffering were not proper elements of damages in an action against a municipality under Section 47-70.
However, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the
lower court's action in refusing to strike from her complaint
words characterizing Mrs. Hollifield's injuries as "painful."
The Court held that mental pain and suffering, connected directly with physical injury, constitute a part of the physical
injury for which compensatory damage may be allowed even
against a municipality, and that here it clearly appeared
from the complaint that the pain alleged to have been suffered was directly connected with the bodily injuries.
Next, the Court considered the right of the plaintiffs to
recover punitive damages against a municipality under Section 47-70 on the appellant city's appeal from a refusal of
the lower courts to strike from the complaints the allegations
characterizing the acts of the city and the other defendants
as "reckless, wilful and wanton." However, the complaints
did not pray for the recovery of punitive damages, but only
demanded actual damages.
The Court concluded that these allegations should have
been stricken out as being irrelevant "since punitive damages
are not recoverable in an action against a municipal corporation, nor have the respondents sought to recover such damages'.. ." Presumably, either grounds was sufficient for the
holding.
The unique issue in the husband's suit was whether or
not he was entitled to recover for, loss of consortium against
a municipality under Section 47-70, as a result of injuries
allegedly sustained by his wife through a defect in the street.
In the lower court the judge had refused to strike from the
husba~id's complaint the allegations relating to his loss, of
her services and his deprivation of his right of consortium.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court and
held that although the husband's loss of consortium as a
result of injuries sustained by his wife is a right which gives
rise to damages, nevertheless, an action for damages in tort
will not lie against a municipal corporation unless the municipal corporation is made liable for the same by statute. -The
Court held that the ,statutory provisions involved must be
strictly construed, and that the Court was without authority
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to enlarge or expand the provisions of the statute by interpretation, but that "amendment by the Legislature is the
only proper means to that end." Consequently, inasmuch as
Section 47-70 does not in specific language authorize an action
against a municipality for the loss of consortium, the Court
refused to expand or enlarge the provisions of the statute to
permit such an action here.
Once again the Court has demonstrated in this decision its
healthy reluctance to engage in judicial legislation.
In the second decision handed down regarding the liability
of a municipality in tort, Brazell v. City of Camden,'° the
Supreme Court, in an appeal from an order overruling a
demurrer, reaffirmed its holding in the Hollifield case that
Section 47-70 "does not provide for or authorize an action
by a spouse against a municipality for medical bills and loss
of consortium occasioned by injury to the husband or wife
through a defect in a street."
Electric Cooperative Held to Be Not a Public Utility
In the case of Black River Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission," the Supreme Court was presented with an issue growing out .of the -rivalry of the appellant Cooperative and a privately owned public utility, The
Carolina Power & Light Company.
Apparently both the Cooperative and the Power Company
had extended their respective transmission lines across a
360 acre tract of land near Sumter which was subsequently
developed as a real estate subdivision. The developers, after
being offered electric service to the area by both utilities,
applied to The Carolina Power &-Light Company for electric
service.
The Cooperative thereupon petitioned the South Carolina
Public Service Commission for an order requiring the Power
Company to cease and desist from extending its lines into
the development. After a hearing, the Commission denied
the petition of the Cooperative on the merits of the controversy.
This action was brought by the Cooperative against, inter
alia, the Commission, the Power Company and the developers,
10. 238 S. C. 580, 121 S. E. 2d 221 (1961).

11. 238 S. C. 282, 120 S. E. W 6 <1961).
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to set aside the above mentioned order of the Commission.
The lower court upheld the Commission's conclusions on the
merits and affirmed them. On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed without considering the merits of the controversy
on the grounds that the Commission had been without jurisdiction to entertain the Cooperative's petition.
The opinion discusses the history of the Public Service
Commission's regulation of electric utilities. It points out
that the South Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of South
Carolina Electric & Gas Company v. South Carolina Public
Service Authority,12 held that the Authority was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and was not an "electric utility" within the meaning of the statutes requiring an
"electric utility" to obtain from the Commission a certificate
of convenience and necessity. In similar fashion, the Court
held here, Cooperatives organized pursuant to the Rural
Electric Cooperative Act of 1939 are free from the control
of the Commission, and therefore, can fix their own rates
and extend their service lines at will into any rural area,
whether or not that area is already adequately served by
a privately owned electric utility. However, the opinion notes
that legislature did not grant cooperatives the exclusive
right to render service anywhere.
The opinion concludes that the proper interpretation of
the term "electric utility" entitled to file a complaint as used
in the Electric Utilities Act does not include a cooperative,
and therefore, the Cooperative here was not entitled, as an
"electric utility", to file a complaint with the Commission in
the nature of that filed here.
The Electric Utilities Act also permits a complaint to be
filed by "any interested person." On the question of whether
or not the Cooperative was an interested person within
the meaning of the statute, the Court concluded that inasmuch
as an electric cooperative is not given an exclusive franchise to
serve rural areas, no legal right of the Cooperative will be
invaded by the Power Company's competition and the Cooperative is, therefore, not an interested party within the
meaning of the statute.
As the opinion points out, any other conclusion would permit a cooperative on the one hand to maintain a monopoly by
preventing the entry of competition, while on the other hand
12. 215 S. C. 193, 54 S. E. 2d 77 (1949).
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imposing exorbitant rates or rendering inefficient service
to those needing electric energy within its service area, and
who could obtain it from no one else. However, the opinion
is careful to state that a cooperative is entitled to be heard,
along with all other persons who have pertinent information,
before the Commission when a regulated public utility applies
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The
holding here merly relates to the filing of a complaint before
the Commission.
The result of the holding is that while a cooperative can
extend its lines without any hearing to compete with private
utilities, a private utility, before extending its lines, is subject
to a hearing, at which the cooperative can present testimony
in opposition.
It also points up the possible need of a statute compelling
the cooperative to obtain a certificate of convenience and
necessity before extending helter-skelter its lines in areas
already properly served.
Eminent Domain Cases
A number of decisions handed down during the period
under review deal with the acquisition of property by autho.nzed public or private bodies through eminent domain.
In the case of South CarolinaState Highway Department
v. Southern Railway Co.,'1 3 the Court had before it the question
-whether or not interest on the award was recoverable by a
land owner where property was taken through eminent domain
by the Highway Department. The lower court had charged the
jury that interest could properly be included in its award and
-the Highway Department appealed from the verdict on the
grounds that the charge was erroneous.
The Supreme Court noticed that the pertinent statutory
provisions under which the Highway Department condemned
the property in question made no mention of interest upon
the award from the time of taking until the time of payment.
Furthermore, the Court noted that this was in contrast with
a number of other condemnation statutes which specifically
permit the land owner to charge interest upon the award from
the date of taking.
13. 239 S. C. 1, 121 S. E. 2d 236 (1961).
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower
court and held that "interest is not to be considered in arriving at just compensation in Highway condemnation cases."
This holding was based on the fact that the omission of a
provision for interest in the Highway Department Statute
would not be presumed to be a legislative oversight to be
remedied by the Court.
It is not uncommon in land condemnation cases in general
for a considerable lapse of time to occur between the time of
the taking and the time of the final award and interest can
amount to a considerable item. It would seem to the writers
of this review that the dissenting opinion by the late Justice
Oxner offers compelling reasons for affirming the judgment
of the lower court. Justice Oxner's legal position that the
failure of the legislature to specifically allow interest in
Highway condemnation cases is not controlling, but that
interest should be included within the "just compensation"
guaranteed by the Constitution and beyond the power of the
legislature to diminish, appears to be well founded on the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Chick
Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department.4
The case of Owens v. State Highway Department's result,
from a rather unique factual situation. The Town of Myrtl.
Beach and the United States Corps of Engineers had obtained
rights of ways for and had constructed a relocation of Highway No. 707, and the relocated highway was turned over to
the State Highway Department in consideration of the Department abandoning the original road bed which was needed
for a runway extension at the Myrtle Beach Air Base. -The
record supports the conclusion that the Highway Department
had nothing to do with the construction of the relocated highway, but that its responsibility in connection therewith commenced only when the same was turned over to the Department and was subsequently maintained by it.
The adjoining property owner brought this action against
the Highway Department for alleged negligence in the construction of the relocated highway and obtained a verdict in
the, lower court for actual damages.. The damages alleged
arose from improper drainage of the relocated highway which
resulted in flood damage to the property of the land owner
14. 159 S. C. 481, 157 S. E. 842 (1931).
15. 239 S. C. 44, 121 S. E. 2d 240 (1961).
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adjoining the right of way. The property owner, however,
limited his action to alleged negligence in the construction
of the highway and did not base his claim on any defective
maintenance of the same after it was turned over to the Highway Department. From the judgment of the lower court
awarding a verdict to the property owner the Highway Department appealed.
The Supreme Court recognized the well established rule that
Article 1, Section 17, of the South Carolina Constitution
guarantees a property owner against loss resulting from a
taking and from a damaging without distinction between the'
two terms on the basis that a deprivation of ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of one's property is equivalent to the
taking of it.
However, the Supreme Court reversed the award of the
lower court on the grounds that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to connect the State Highway Department with the construction of the relocated highway so as to
render it liable to the property owner for damaging or taking
his property; and held, therefore, that the trial Judge erred
in refusing to grant the Highway Department's motion for a'
directed verdict. The concurring opinion by the late Justice
Oxner points out that a recovery might be sustained in a
proper case brought on the theory that the Highway Depart-*
ment refused to rectify the defective condition after it took
over the road, or on the theory that the Highway Department
by adopting the original taking subjected itself to the obligation to pay just compensation originally incumbent upon
its predecessor.
16
The case of South CarolinaHighway Department v. Spann
arises out of a condemnation proceeding, but has greater
signifi ance under the subject of pleadings. The holding* is
to the effect that the lower court was powerless to extend
the time for taking an appeal from the award of the Board
of Condemnation beyond the statutory period. The property
owner had not appealed within the prescribed twenty day
period and had obtained an extension from the lower court
on the grounds that the resolution making the award was
ambiguous or misleading. The- Supreme Court in reversing
held that the property owner's remedy -was only by way of
appeal within the twenty day statutory period.
16. 239 S. C. 437, 123 S. E. -2d 648 (1962).
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In the case of The South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Hammond,17 the Highway Department had proceeded
against the owner and lessee of property to acquire a rightof-way. The lower court dismissed the landowner's motion
for a trial separate and apart from the trial involving the
lessee. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The opinion holds that a lessee has an interest in condemned
property and is, therefore, properly made a party to condemnation proceedings, and that inasmuch as the Highway
Department is entitled to an assessment of all damages
arising from the taking in a single proceeding, all interested
persons should be made parties.
Regarding the landowner's claim for a separate trial, the
Court held that the lower court properly refused the landowner's motion for a severance, and pointed out that a separate trial to each owner of an estate or interest in condemned
land is not required, and will not be granted unless the moving
party can show that legal prejudice will result from a joint
trial. The Court, however, and without elaboration, refused
to pass on the question whether a collective or joint verdict
should be rendered at the trial of the case.
Does this mean that a lump sum verdict in favor of the
landowner and tenant would be upheld? If this is true, then
are not the landowner's and the lessee's constitutional rights
to be paid for their respective property rights jeopardized?
It is true that the landowner and lessee could later litigate the
quantum of their respective shares, but if this is to be the
rule, then it would seem that the promotion of justice would
be better served if there were a statute authorizing the verdict to be appropriately divided by the jury so that both the
landowner and the lessee would be awarded compensation for
their respective interests in the award for the taking of
property.
In the case of Atkinson v. CarolinaPower and Light Co.' 8
the Supreme Court considered the right of a private electric
Company to condemn the fee simple title of land needed for
the purpose of impounding waters to form a lake to be used
in conjunction with the Company's generating plant.
It appears that the water in the lake itself normally would
cover land up to about the contour elevation 222. The Com17. 238 S.C. 317, 120 S. E. 2d 21 (1961).
18. 239 S. C. 150, 121 S. E. 2d 743 (1961).
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pany, however, sought to acquire the fee title not only to
the lake bed itself, but also to a body of land back of the
water's edge surrounding the lake between the contour elevations 222 and 230. The question in issue was the right of the
Company to condemn the fee in any of the property sought.
The Supreme Court, adopted the order of the lower court
and held that the defendant company was properly authorized
by the legislature to exercise the power of eminent domain
"subject to supervision of the Courts to avoid fraudulent or
capricious abuse . . ." regarding what land and how much
land will be condemned. Furthermore, the decision holds
that the burden is on the landowner to allege and establish
bad faith and abuse of discretion. In the instant case the
Court found that the evidence adduced by the defendant
company clearly establishes its need for the fee simple title
to the property being sought and the inadequacy of an easement or flowage rights. The opinion notes that the right of
the private corporation to condemn land for public use has
been recognized in this State for more than fifty years.
Zoning Ordinance Enforced
In its decision in the case of City of Florence v. Turbeville '9
the Supreme Court considered a number of interesting questions relating to enforcement of zoning ordinances.
On August 18, 1952, a comprehensive zoning ordinance for
the City of Florence was adopted. At that time and until
October 1959, the property owners conducted a dancing
school in an area of the city devoted to business (at No. 331-A
West Evans Street). Subsequent to the adoption of the
zoning ordinance and on February 18, 1953, Appellants
purchased a house and lot on Madison Avenue in the City of
Florence within a R-1 Residential District. This property
was used as a residence with limited use for private dancing
lessons until about October 1959, when the complete operation of the dancing school was shifted from Evans Street
to the Madison Avenue property.
The school consisted of about 220 children and classes Were
held six days a week. However, there were no signs of advertising and there was no disturbance caused by noise. The only
apparent effect was considerable traffic when the children
19. 239 S. C. 126, 121 S. E. 2d 437 (1961).
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were brought and picked up. The lower court permanently
enjoined the operation of the school at the Madison Avenue
address. On appeal by the property owners the Supreme Court
affirmed.
First, the Supreme Court found no merit in the contention
that the ordinance was never validly adopted which was urged
on the grounds that the City had no existence as a municipality from January 8, 1952 until March 20, 1953. This contention was based on the fact that the Act chartering the
City was omitted from the 1952 Code effective on January 8,
1952, and that the City ceased to exist until revived by the
1953 Legislature. The opinion points out that there is no
requirement that the Code contain special statutes incorporating individual cities and towns, but that it must and can
only contain the general statutes. Further, the opinion holds
that the existence of the City can only be attacked directly
and not in the proceeding here; and finally that the 1953
legislation validated all acts of the Mayor and City Council
during the period in question.
Secondly, the Court struck down the appellants' contention
that they were in the dancing school business before the
ordinance was adopted and should be allowed to continue as
a lawful non-conforming use, and notes that the zoning ordinance antedated the establishment in 1959 o the school at
the Madison Street address.
Next, the Court affirmed the. findings below that the
dancing school was of such size, scope and regularity that it
does not fall within the exemption of a. customary home
occupation,
The appellants also contended that their' dancing school
was being carried on in an'orderly and unobjectionable fashion
and iAs suppression was not reasonably related to the public
safety, health, convenience, prosperity or general welfare.
tUpon a consideration of the authorities upholding general
exclusions so drawn as to exclude innocuous establishments,
the Court concluded that the zoning classification was reasonable and should be enforced. It noted, that the purpose of
the zoning laws was to preserve the character of a residential
neighborhood and that the intrusion of commercial enterprises
,could eventually cause a break-down of the -City's, comprehensive zoning scheme.
.
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Finally, the appellants contended that the application of the
zoning ordinance here was unconstitutional invasion of their
constitutional rights. However, the Court noted that zoning
ordinances generally have been upheld as a proper exercise
of the police power, and held that the appellants had not
sustained the burden of proving that their dancing school
fell within a permitted classification (churches, certain types
of schools, libraries, country clubs, etc.). The Court could
find no authority to warrant a conclusion that a dancing
school should not be distinguished from the permitted classifications.
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